| Table of Contents |
| | Acknowledgements | xi |
| | Table of cases | xiii |
| | Table of statutes | xvii |
| 1. | Proportionality, deference and institutional sensitivity | 1 |
| 1.1. | Rights-based judicial review | 3 |
| 1.2. | Proportionality - A judicial tool for navigating rights | 5 |
| 1.2.1. | Proportionality as an independent standard | 8 |
| 1.2.2. | Proportionality as a secondary question | 11 |
| 1.2.3. | A process-based approach | 13 |
| 1.3. | Proportionality-based judicial review of the different forms of government action | 14 |
| 1.4. | The problem of uncertainty and the need for deference | 18 |
| 1.4.1. | Epistemic uncertainty | 20 |
| 1.4.2. | Early spatial approaches | 22 |
| 1.5. | Accounting for deference | 23 |
| 1.5.1. | Due deference | 24 |
| 1.5.2. | Non-doctrinalists | 26 |
| 1.6. | Integrating deference within proportionality | 30 |
| 1.7. | A framework for separation-of-powers arguments | 34 |
| 1.8. | Building an institutionally sensitive approach | 36 |
| 2. | An integrated account of proportionality and deference | 39 |
| 2.1. | The inputs of proportionality | 40 |
| 2.1.1. | Human rights norms | 42 |
| 2.1.2. | Public interest norms | 43 |
| 2.1.3. | Derivative norms | 49 |
| 2.2. | The four stages of the proportionality test | 50 |
| 2.3. | The process of proportionality | 53 |
| 2.3.1. | Rational connection | 54 |
| 2.3.2. | Minimal impairment | 55 |
| 2.3.3. | Overall balancing | 56 |
| 2.3.4. | A flexible process that produces human rights rules | 59 |
| 2.4. | Integrating three categories of deference | 62 |
| 2.4.1. | Structural deference | 63 |
| 2.4.2. | Uncertainty and deference | 67 |
| 2.4.3. | Empirical deference | 68 |
| 2.4.4. | Normative deference | 71 |
| 2.4.5. | The level of deference | 73 |
| 2.5. | Conclusion | 74 |
| 3. | An institutionally sensitive approach | 76 |
| 3.1. | Forms of government activity | 79 |
| 3.2. | Institutional factors that affect proportionality and deference | 85 |
| 3.2.1. | Choice of objectives | 85 |
| 3.2.2. | Range of options | 90 |
| 3.2.3. | Scope of the decision: individual vs. general | 94 |
| 3.3. | Multi-level decision-making | 97 |
| 3.4. | Institutional sensitivity and the reasons for deference | 104 |
| 3.4.1. | Democratic legitimacy | 107 |
| 3.4.2. | Institutional competence | 113 |
| 3.4.3. | Sections 3 and 4 of the HRA and Parliament | 117 |
| 3.5. | Conclusion | 120 |
| 4. | Proportionality and deference in judicial review of administrative decisions: immigration | 123 |
| 4.1. | Inputs of the proportionality test | 126 |
| 4.1.1. | Human rights principles | 127 |
| 4.1.2. | Public interest principles | 134 |
| 4.1.3. | Rational connection | 141 |
| 4.2. | Minimal impairment | 142 |
| 4.3. | Overall balancing | 148 |
| 4.3.1. | Overall balancing and empirical deference | 151 |
| 4.3.2. | Overall balancing and normative deference | 156 |
| 4.3.3. | Overall balancing and delay | 161 |
| 4.4. | Conclusion | 164 |
| 5. | Proportionality and deference in judicial review of legislation: criminal justice | 166 |
| 5.1. | Inputs of the proportionality test | 168 |
| 5.1.1. | Human rights principles | 169 |
| 5.1.2. | Public interest principles | 176 |
| 5.1.3. | Rational connection | 181 |
| 5.2. | Minimal impairment | 182 |
| 5.2.1. | Minimal impairment and structural deference | 185 |
| 5.2.2. | Minimal impairment and empirical deference | 191 |
| 5.2.3. | Minimal impairment and section 4 of the HRA | 196 |
| 5.3. | Overall balancing | 198 |
| 5.3.1. | Overall balancing, empirical deference and the general scope of rules | 202 |
| 5.3.2. | Overall balancing and normative deference | 203 |
| 5.4. | The reasons for deference | 204 |
| 5.5. | Conclusion | 208 |
| 6. | Proportionality and deference in judicial review of multi-level decisions: housing | 210 |
| 6.1. | Inputs of the proportionality test | 211 |
| 6.1.1. | Human rights principles | 211 |
| 6.1.2. | Public interest principles | 215 |
| 6.2. | Minimal impairment and overall balancing at individual levels of government | 220 |
| 6.3. | Minimal impairment and overall balancing in multi-level cases | 231 |
| 6.4. | Conclusion | 252 |
| 7. | Conclusion | 254 |
| 7.1. | Five categorisations | 255 |
| 7.2. | An institutionally sensitive approach | 257 |
| 7.3. | Institutional sensitivity and the HRA case law | 261 |
| 7.3.1. | Administrative decision-making cases | 261 |
| 7.3.2. | Rule-making cases | 262 |
| 7.3.3. | Multi-level decision cases | 262 |
| 7.4. | Benefits of the institutionally sensitive approach | 263 |
| 7.5. | Conclusion | 265 |
| | Bibliography | 267 |
| | Index | 283 |
